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Abstract:  
The objective of this paper is to extend the literature on bank capital buffer by considering the 
role of bank heterogeneity. Using a sample of European commercial banks over 1992-2006, 
we show that four key determinants – risk, business cycle, market and peer discipline – have 
different impact on capital buffer depending on banks’ financing mode, activity or size. Our 
results offer a framework for discussing the appropriateness of the still on-going suggestions 
on bank capital regulation. Whereas they support the differentiating measures undertaken in 
Basel 3 such as specific capital surcharges for SIFIs, they disagree with the adoption of 
uniform countercyclical buffers. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Different studies deal with the determinants of bank capital buffer. They mainly focus 
on the relationship between a given factor and the buffer by controlling for its other potential 
determinants (Lindquist (2004), Jokipii and Milne (2008), Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010)). For 
example, Jokipii and Milne (2008) and Ayuso et al. (2004)
2
 focus on the cyclical behavior of 
capital buffer. They show that the economic cycle (captured through the GDP) and capital 
buffer are negatively related. Nier and Baumann [2006]
3
 examine the link between market 
discipline and banks’ capital ratios. They mainly show that, ceteris paribus, stronger market 
discipline, taken into account via the portion of uninsured liabilities, leads to a higher capital 
ratio. Alfon et al. (2004)
4
 argue that regulatory environment, market discipline and risk 
management are the main determinants of the amount of capital held by banks.  
However, all these studies consider all banks equally, or focus only on banking 
specialisation whereas banks have evolved towards the universal banking model, inducing a 
substantial heterogeneity in banks’ activities even in the same banking specialisation. Banks 
mainly focused on traditional activities (loans supply and deposits collection) coexist with 
banks more involved in market activities. Similarly, large conglomerates coexist with small 
entities. We suspect that this heterogeneity may affect the determinants of capital buffer. 
Thus, we consider a set of European commercial banks over 1992-2006 and consider several 
sub-samples depending on three factors: bank activity type, financing mode and size. Indeed, 
European commercial banks are heterogeneous both in terms of size and balance sheet 
structure. However, the Basel capital constraint does not differentiate banks and seems almost 
set to fit banks turned towards traditional activities.  
The main novelty of this paper lies in the fact that we consider the impact of the 
heterogeneity of banks' characteristics on the determinants of capital buffer. We assume that 
these determinants might differ depending on banks’ size, activity and financing mode. Our 
hope is that our results might offer a framework for discussing the appropriateness of the still 
on-going suggestions on bank capital regulation. Concretely, according to our results, we 
might be able to judge whether the new Basel 3 measures such as the capital surcharge for 
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) or the  prescription of a uniform 
countercyclical buffer for all banks are appropriate or not. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe the method, the 
set of variables and the sample of banks. We present our results in section 3. Section 4 
concludes the paper. 
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 Jokipii and Milne [2008] use a sample of European banks from 1997 to 2004 and Ayuso, Perez and Saurina, 
(2004) consider Spanish banks from 1986 to 2000. 
3
 They use a substantial cross-country panel data of 32 countries from 1993 to 2000. 
4
 They consider British banks from 1997 Q2 to 2002 Q2. 
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2. Sample, method and variables 
 
The sample consists of 742 commercial banks from 16 European countries
5
 over the period 
1992-2006
6
. Accounting data for individual banks are obtained from Bankscope Fitch IBCA 
and we retain banks for which information about the total capital ratio
7
 is available.  
 
Before taking into account bank heterogeneity, we derive the determinants of European 
banks’ capital buffer by estimating the model defined below on the whole sample of banks. 
Subscripts i  and t  denote bank and period respectively.  
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1
6 , 1 7 , 8 , 1 9 , 10 , ,
                        i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t t i i t
buffer profit roe llpa obsa comp
uninsliab loang nla size gdpg u
     
      
    
 
     
       
(1) 
The regression includes time (τt) and individual (ηi) fixed effects and standard errors are 
robust to heteroscedasticity. Following Lindquist (2004), we introduce one year lag in 
explanatory variables which are susceptible to be endogenous in order to avoid simultaneity 
problems.  
 
Table 1 presents the definition of the variables, the expected sign and shows some 
descriptive statistics for our sample of banks. We can notice that it exhibits a relatively high 
level of heterogeneity. The capital buffer is on average 6.10 and we denote a high volatility of 
this buffer as the standard deviation is 6.29. Besides, we can see that the sample of banks 
presents high differences in terms of size, activity type, and financing mode.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Austria (19), Belgium (18), Denmark (65) Finland (11), France (147), Germany (28), Greece (18), Ireland (14), 
Italy (198), Netherlands (50), Norway (21), Portugal (20), Spain (31), Sweden (31), Switzerland (20), and United 
Kingdom (51). We notice that French and Italian banks are comparatively well represented in our sample. To 
make sure that our results do not depend on this unbalanced sample representation we ran, as a robustness check, 
all our regressions by excluding the banks from these two countries. Our conclusions remain unchanged. 
6
 Note that on the whole time period, banks are under the Basel I framework. 
7
 Total capital ratio is (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/ Risk weighted assets and is used to construct our dependent variable. 
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Table 1: Definition of the variables and summary descriptive statistics on 1992-2006.  
Variable Mnemonic Definition 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max Expected 
Sign 
Capital 
buffer  
buffer 
((Tier 1+Tier 2 
capital)/Risk-weighted 
assets)-regulatory 
minimum requirements 
6.10 6.29 -7.90 33.70 
 
Profitability profit 
Post tax profit/Total 
assets 
0.66 1.09 -12.37 10.60 
+ 
Equity cost roe Net income/Equity
8
 9.39 12.54 -99.81 98.45 - 
risk llpa 
Loan loss 
provisions/Total assets 
0.54 0.67 0.00 6.58 
-/+ 
Off-balance 
sheet 
obsa 
Off-balance sheet/Total 
assets 
23.75 28.70 0.00 236.44 
+ 
Market 
discipline 
uninsliab 
Total uninsured 
funding/Total liabilities 
47.16 27.04 1.03 100.00 
+ 
Peer 
discipline 
comp 
Annual mean of the 
capital buffer of banks 
in the same country 
6.10 1.97 0.10 14.15 
+ 
Size size Total assets (€ mil.) 9 36558.00 1.14*105 9.54 1.57*106 - 
Credit 
demand 
loang 
Annual net loan growth 
rate 
13.56 28.94 -100.00 272.87 
- 
Asset 
structure 
nla Net loans
10
/Total assets 
54.66 22.33 0.00 98.86 
- 
Economic 
cycle 
gdpg 
Annual growth rate of 
the real GDP 
(deseasonalized) 
2.29 1.67 -3.97 15.43 
- 
 
After studying the determinants of European banks’ capital buffer in a general framework, 
we investigate whether they differ depending on banks’ size and balance sheet structure. In 
this aim, we estimate our equation separately on different sub-samples constructed on the 
basis of the size of banks, the proportion of loans in total assets and that of customer deposits 
in total liabilities. We define six sub-samples on the basis of three criteria: 
- Financing mode: banks heavily (slightly) relying on customer deposits are defined as 
those with a ratio customer deposits/total liabilities greater (lower) than its median 
value (55.01%)  
- Credit activity: banks with a high (low) credit activity are defined as those with a ratio 
of net loans/total assets greater (lower) than its median value
11
 (56.23%); 
                                                          
8
 Notice that in our regressions, due to colinearity issues, the variable roe corresponds to the residuals of the 
regression of the Return on Equity on our profit variable. 
9
 In our regressions, we consider the natural logarithm of total assets. 
10
 Net loans are: gross loans – loan loss reserves. 
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- Size: banks with total assets greater (lower) than one billion12 Euros are considered as 
large (small) banks; 
 
3. Results 
 
First, we study the determinants of capital buffer on the whole sample of banks. The 
results are presented in column (1) of table 2. We can see that seven out of the ten 
independent variables are significant at the one percent level with associated coefficients 
presenting the expected sign. Like Jokipii and Milne (2008), we find that the profit variable 
significantly and positively affects capital buffer. It appears that retained earnings are used by 
banks to increase their capital buffer. Our risk variable llpa which corresponds to the ratio of 
loan loss provisions to total assets is also highly significantly and positively related with 
capital buffer. This suggests that banks with greater expected losses raise capital buffer in 
order to reduce insolvency risk. Our indicators comp and uninsliab are highly significant and 
their coefficients are positive suggesting that European commercial banks are both disciplined 
by their peers and uninsured debtholders. This result is in line with those of Nier and 
Baumann (2006), Lindquist (2004) and Alfon and al. (2004). The loan demand variable loang 
is, as expected, negatively and significantly related to capital buffer indicating that high 
annual loan growth rate increases the capital requirement ratio and therefore reduces the bank 
capital buffer. This confirms the results of Ayuso et al. (2004) and Jokipii and Milne (2008). 
Similarly, the ratio net loans/total assets (nla) is negatively related to capital buffer, like in 
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2010) and Jokipii and Milne (2008), implying that banks more 
involved in credit activity have lower capital buffer. The size coefficient is significantly 
negative which gives support to the notion that large banks have lower capital buffer than 
small banks. This different behaviour may be explained by, among other things, the portfolio 
diversification and the economies of scale in screening and monitoring enjoyed by large 
banks which can allow them to operate with lower capital buffer.  
Thus, our general findings are in line with those obtained in the previous literature. 
However, we suspect that the high heterogeneity of European banks in terms of size, activities 
and financing mode might have an impact on the relationship between these traditional 
determinants and capital buffer that is why we estimate this relationship on different sub-
samples (columns 2-7 of Table 2).  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
11
 For both financing mode and credit activity, we considered other criteria to separate banks. Banks with a low 
value of the considered ratio are defined as those with a ratio lower than the first quartile and  banks with a high 
value of the considered ratio are defined as those with a ratio greater than the third quartile. The first quartile is 
44.72% for net loans/ total assets and 39.52% for customer deposits/ total liabilities. The third quartile is 70.59% 
for net loans/ total assets and 73.01% for customer deposits/ total liabilities. Considering these criteria leads to 
the same conclusions. 
12
 This common criterion corresponds to the definition of large banks by Bankscope Fitch IBCA. 
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Table 2: Determinants of capital buffer taking into account bank heterogeneity 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 1 4 , 1 5 , 1
6 , 1 7 , 8 , 1 9 , 10 , ,
                        i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t
buffer profit roe llpa obsa comp
uninsliab loang nla size gdpg u
     
      
    
 
     
       
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variables 
Whole 
sample 
(Net loans/ 
Total assets) 
low 
(Net loans/ 
Total assets) 
high 
(Customer 
deposits/ Total 
Liabilities) low 
(Customer 
deposits/ Total 
Liabilities) high Large Small 
        
        
C 50.424 62.036 33.325 64.153 21.458 41.289 44.592 
 (15.746)*** (12.578)*** (7.434)*** (13.262)*** (3.886)*** (10.391)*** (5.646)*** 
        
Profit 0.481 0.595 0.426 0.549 0.478 0.590 0.518 
 (4.713)*** (3.267)*** (3.674)*** (3.715)*** (3.456)*** (4.097)*** (3.202)*** 
        
Roe -0.010 -0.0008 -0.024 -0.021 -0.034 -0.015 -0.044 
 (-0.945) (-0.045) (-1.751)* (-1.439) (-1.819)* (-1.276) (-1.605) 
        
Llpa 0.389 0.675 0.221 0.435 -0.193 0.534 -0.187 
 (2.752)*** (2.497)** (1.487) (2.125)** (-0.936) (2.870)*** (-0.768) 
        
Obsa -0.002 0.00003 -0.006 0.0006 -0.007 0.003 -0.012 
 (-0.807) (0.009) (-1.759)* (0.178) (-1.792)* (1.332) (-1.384) 
        
Comp 0.155 0.135 0.102 0.050 0.176 0.103 0.374 
 (3.461)*** (1.848)* (1.943)* (0.844) (2.585)*** (2.336)** (2.672)*** 
        
Uninsliab 0.024 0.062 -0.015 0.028 0.013 -0.0002 0.031 
 (3.610)*** (5.331)*** (-1.931)* (2.624)*** (1.196) (-0.031) (2.028)** 
        
Loang -0.019 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016 -0.025 -0.014 -0.044 
 (-7.314)*** (-4.846)*** (-4.484)*** (-5.588)*** (-5.4480)*** (-5.435)*** (-6.798)*** 
        
Nla -0.092 -0.093 -0.076 -0.079 -0.089 -0.082 -0.141 
 (-12.246)*** (-6.419)*** (-7.567)*** (-7.931)*** (-7.620)*** (-10.313)*** (-8.321)*** 
        
Size -2.790 -3.593 -1.604 -3.588 -0.838 -2.061 -2.545 
 (-13.444)*** (-11.644)*** (-5.331)*** (-12.333)*** (-2.182)** (-8.434)*** (-4.013)*** 
        
Gdpg 0.052 0.051 -0.014 0.022 0.101 -0.067 0.339 
 (0.987) (0.739) (-0.178) (0.309) (1.316) (-1.316) (2.230)** 
        
        
Observations: 2874 1380 1493 1404 1462 1985 889 
R-squared: 0.824 0.867 0.818 0.870 0.839 0.782 0.858 
        
        
This table shows estimation results obtained using the panel fixed effects method. The regression includes both time and individual 
fixed effects. Net loans/total assets is considered as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole sample 
(56.23%). Customer deposits/total liabilities is considered as high (low) if it is greater (lower) than the median value on the whole 
sample (55.01%). Large (small) banks are those with total assets greater (lower) than one billion euros (Bankscope criterion). 
Standard errors are adjusted robust to heteroscedasticity. ***, ** and * pertain to 1, 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
T-stats are between parentheses.  
 
Considering the results obtained on the different sub-samples, we can notice that the 
profitability (profit), the size of the bank (size), the importance of loans in total assets (nla) 
and loan demand (loang) are always significant determinants of capital buffer. Thus, the 
heterogeneity of banks does not affect the relevance of these variables.  
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However, we can notice several different behaviors for the other variables depending 
on banks’ credit activity, financing mode13 and size14.  
More precisely, the variable reflecting credit risk (llpa) appears significant only for 
large banks and banks more involved in non traditional activities that is banks with low ratios 
of net loans/total assets and customer deposits/total liabilities. The significance of this 
variable implies that credit risk is not properly taken into account in the capital constraint and 
that these banks have a better assessment of this risk which leads to the building of capital 
buffers. This result suggests that the refinements of the capital constraint to better capture risk 
might have an impact on bank actual capital essentially for small banks and banks involved in 
traditional activities.    
The market discipline variable, uninsliab, is significant at least at the five percent level 
with the expected positive coefficient only for banks more turned towards non traditional 
activities and small banks. This may reflect the fact that the Basel capital constraint does not 
correctly take into account risks related to non traditional activities and that uninsured 
debtholders, aware of these risks, exert a pressure on banks to hold capital buffer. Besides, the 
significance of this variable only for small banks may be interpreted as a Too Big To Fail 
effect: large banks are considered as Too Big To Fail by uninsured debtholders which have no 
incentive to discipline them. Thus, if market discipline is to be considered in complement to 
capital regulation, it might be effective only for banks not perceived as Too Big To Fail and 
those more involved in non traditional activities.   
We also find a significant positive relationship between the buffer and the annual 
growth rate of the real gross domestic product (gdpg) only for small banks. This result shows 
that capital buffers co-move positively with the business cycle highlighting a forward-looking 
behaviour i.e. small banks tend to increase capital buffer during good times that should be 
drawn upon during bad times. Thus, prescribing a uniform countercyclical buffer for all banks 
does not appear appropriate. 
Finally, the effectiveness of peer discipline (comp) varies with banks’ financing mode. 
It is only significant for banks highly funded by deposits. Thus, it seems that the competition 
between banks to attract deposit funding is fierce and capital buffer may act as a signaling 
tool for these banks. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 We ensure that the distinction between banks according to the importance of the ratio Net loans/ Total assets is 
not equivalent to the distinction according to the importance of the ratio Customer deposits/ Total Liabilities.  
Only 54.3%  of banks with low Customer deposits/ Total Liabilities ratio are also banks with low Net loans/ 
Total assets ratio and 58,6% of banks with high Customer deposits/ Total Liabilities ratio are also banks with 
high Net loans/ Total assets ratio.   
14
 Similarly, we ensure that the distinction between banks according to the size is not equivalent to the 
distinctions made according to the importance of loans or customer deposits. 53.7% of large banks have a high 
Net loans/ Total assets ratio and 41.6% a high (Customer deposits/ Total Liabilities) ratio. 40.8% of small banks 
have a low Net loans/ Total assets ratio and 40.4% a low (Customer deposits/ Total Liabilities) ratio. Thus, our 
criteria to separate banks are not equivalent and do not lead to identical sub-samples. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we study the determinants of bank capital buffer considering bank 
heterogeneity. We find that the impact on capital buffer of factors such as risk, market 
discipline and economic cycle, which have been the main focus of the previous literature, 
differs depending on banks’ financing mode, activity or size. These results might offer a 
framework to appreciate the appropriateness of the still on-going suggestions on bank capital 
regulation. More precisely, to tackle the procyclical behaviour of the regulatory capital in 
banking, it has been decided - in what is now known as Basel 3- to require banks to hold a 
countercyclical buffer of a magnitude between 0 and 2.5 % of risk weighted assets whatever 
the size and the type of the bank (BCBS, 2010). However, as our results indicate, the capital 
buffer is already countercyclical for small banks. Consistent with our findings, we therefore 
argue that this new burden might be nuanced as small and large banks seem to build 
differently their capital buffer. In the same way, our results suggest that reliance on market 
discipline for large banks might be a bad option. Hence, we welcome the underway Basel 3 
measures, such as the capital surcharge, directed specifically towards Systemically Important 
Financial Institutions (SIFIs).  
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